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Summary findings
The theoretical literature on trade follows two different  would usually conclude that tariffs for the rest of the
approaches to explaining the endogenous formation of  world  decline after the custom union's  formation - a
customs unions:  rationale related to free-rider effects in larger lobbying
(1) The terms-of-trade approach, in which integrating  groups.
partners are willing to exploit terms-of-trade effects.  It is important to recognize the forces behind the
Using the terms-of-trade approach, one concludes that  formation of customs unions. Most researchers have
tariffs on imports from the rest of the world should  focused on the second approach and neglected terms of
increase after the formation of a regional bloc, because  trade as a possible explanatory variable. Both rationales
the market power of the region increases and terms-of-  explain a significant share of tariff information.
trade externalities can be internalized in the custom  Results, write Olarreaga, Soloaga, and Winters, suggest
union's  common external tariff. As the union forms, the  that both forces were important  in formation  of the
"domestic market" gets larger and members'  Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur).
international market power increases.  Terms-of-trade effects account for between 6 percent
(2) The interest group pressures (political economy)  and 28 percent of the explained variation in the structure
approach, in which, for example, the customs union may  of protection. There is also evidence that the terms-of-
offer the potential for exchanging markets or protection  trade externalities among Mercosur's members have been
within the enlarged market. Using this approach, one  internalized in the common external tariff.
This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the
political economy of trade protection.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-5555,  fax 202-522-1159,  email
address ltabada@worldbank.org. Policy  ResearchWorking Papers are also posted on theWeb athttp://www.worldbank.orgl
research/workingpapers. Marcelo Olarreaga maybe contacted atmolarreaga@worldbank.org. November 1999. (41 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less  than fully polished. The
papers  carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
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The international trade literature has followed at least two distinct approaches to explain
the  existence  of  tariffs.  The  first  one  is  known  as  the  terms-of-trade  approach.  It
explains the presence of tariffs in terms of the ability of large countries to influence world
prices. A  tariff  reduces  the  international demand  for  the  import-good  and  therefore
decreases  its  international  prices,  which  in  turn  improves  the  terms-of-trade  of  the
importing country. This allows the tariff-imposing country to  redistribute revenue from
the rest-of-the-world to  itself. The second approach is known as the endogenous tariff
formation  theory  and  views trade  policy  as  a  way  of  redistributing  income  towards
preferential groups or lobbies --preferred in a political-economy sense.
In analyzing the effects of regionalism on the multilateral system, these two approaches
may  lead  to  different  conclusions. For  example,  using  the  terms-of-trade  approach,
Krugman (1991) concludes that tariffs on rest-of-the-world imports should increase after
the formation of a regional block. This is related to the internalization of terms-of-trade
effects in the Common External Tariff (CET). Indeed, if potential members of a CU tend
to import similar goods, then the formation of a larger block will naturally lead to higher
tariffs,  as  market  power  in  international  markets  increase.  Other  authors,  such  as
Richardson (1994) using political economy arguments find that tariffs, with respect to the
rest-of-the world, should decline after the formation of a customs union. This is generally
due to Olson's free-riding problem in larger groups. As the lobbying group size increases,
it becomes more difficult to get organized and the effectiveness of the lobbying group
declines. Thus, it seems important to know what the forces are behind tariffs.
Surprisingly, empiricalresearch on tariff structureshas essentially focused on the political-
economy  determinants  of protection  and  neglected  the  terms-of-trade  as  a  possible
explanatory variable. This  study seeks to  rectify this  omission in  a case-study  of the
formation  of Mercosur's  Common External Tariff (CET). The CET was negotiated in
1994  and  has  already  been  shown  to  owe  quite  a  lot  to  political  economy  forces
(Olarreaga  and  Soloaga,  1998). In this  paper we  add in terms  of trade  factors as  an
1additional explanatory variable and find that they account for  between 6 and 27 percent
of the explained cross-commodity variation in tariffs.
We model tariff formation both at the tariff-line level (or as close as we can get t:o it) -
which is clearly the right level for identifying trade effects - and at the industry level -
which may be more appropriate for some of the political economy factors. At each level
considerable care is required to avoid econometric pitfalls arising from the facts that tariff
data are truncated alt  exogenously determnined  maximum and minimum levels and that we
need  to  convert  data  measured  at  one  level  of  aggregation  to  the  other.  These
complications aside, however, our approach just  straight-forwardly regresses tariff levels
on  political  economy  variables,  such  as  industry  concentration,  unionisation,  capital-
labour ratios and import-penetration, and on measures of Mercosur's  market-power -- its
power to influence its terms of trade. Our more successful equations measure the latter by
the share of world exports of a commodity that it purchases as imports.
Our  results  do  not  undermine  earlier  findings  that  political  economy  factors  were
important to the determination of Mercosur's  CET, but they do suggest that they need to
be supplemented by market-power effects. The importance of the latter for even rclative
small traders  such as Mercosur  is, perhaps,  surprising (Mercosur accounts for ( n]  y  1
percent  of  world  mrarkets). This  suggests both  that  terms  of trade  effects  shouLld  be
included in  other models of tariff determination and that the  so-called "small-c(:  untry
assumption",  which  rules  out  terms  of trade  effects for  most  countries,  is  of li rnited
relevance.
21.  Introduction
The international trade literature has followed at least two distinct approaches to explain
the  existence  of  tariffs.  The  first  one  is  known  as  the  terms-of-trade  approach.  It
explains the presence of tariffs in terms of the ability of large countries to influence world
prices.  A  tariff  reduces  the  international  demand  for  the  import-good  and  therefore
decreases  its  international  prices,  which  in  turn  improves the  terms-of-trade  of  the
importing  country  (see  Corden,  1974).  This  allows  the  tariff-imposing  country  to
redistribute revenue from the rest-of-the-world to itself. The second approach is known as
the endogenous tariffformation  theory and views trade policy as a way of redistributing
income towards preferential groups or lobbies --preferred in a political-economy sense
(see Hillman, 1982 or Mayer 1984).1
The explanation for regionalism or Customs Union (CU) formation has also traditionally
followed these two approaches (see Winters, 1996). The terms-of-trade theory has argued
that  the  formation  of  a  CU may also  be  explained by the  willingness of  integrating
partners to internalize their terms-of-trade effect. Indeed, if countries tend to import the
same product, then by forming a customs union they increase their international market
power (see Riezman, 1985 or Krugman,  1991, and the literature that has followed). The
endogenous  tariff  formation  literature  focuses  on the  ability to  exchange  markets  or
protection within CU (see Hillman, Long and Moser,  1995 or Grossman and Helpman,
1995a).
In analyzing the effects of regionalism on the multilateral system, these approaches lead
to  different  conclusions  (see  Winters,  1996). For  example, using  the  terms-of-trade
approach, Krugman (1991) (or Bond and Syropoulos, 1996) concludes that tariffs on rest-
of-the-world  imports  should increase after the formation  of  a  regional block.  This  is
related to the  internalization  of terms-of-trade effects  in the Common External Tariff
There  is at least a third approach  which  emphasize  on real  world  departures  from Pareto  optiniality,
providing  a second-best  argument  for  the  use  of  protection  based  on  economic  efficiency  (see
Bhagwati, 1971).  This includes:  infant-industry  arguments  (which  are of particular  relevance  in the
case of Latin America),  imperfect  competition,  tariff  revenue  motives,  etc...In  fact, the first approach
above may  be considered  as a sub-category  of the theory  of tariffs  as responses  to distortions.
3(CET). Indeed,  if potential  members  of a  CU tend to  import  similar goods, then the
formation  of a  larger  block  will naturally  lead to  higher tariffs,  as  market  power  in
international markets increase. Other  authors, such as Richardson (1994) or Panagariya
and Findlay (1994), using political-economy arguments, find that tariffs with respect to
the rest-of-the  worlid should  decline after  the formation  of a  customs  union.  This  is
generally due to Olson's free-riding problem in larger groups. As the lobbying group size
increases, it becomes more difficult to get organized and the effectiveness of the lobb1ying
group declines. 2 Thus, it seems important to know what the forces are behind tariffs
This  paper  addresses  the  following  questions:  What  is  the  dominating  force  b&ehind
regionalism? Are regional integration blocks formed to internalize terms-of-trade effects?
Or are political-economy forces the predominant determinants? The analysis is conducted
ex-post,  in  the  sense  that  we  take  the  regional  block  as  given  and  identify  the
determinants of the CET. In other words, we  do not explicitly study the ex-ante forces
that  led  to  the  formation  of  the  regional  block,  but  infer  this  by  identifying  the
determinants of the ex-post structure of the CET.
The Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) seems an interesting case from
which to try  to identify which  of these  motivations is behind regionalism, for al: least
three reasons.
First,  Mercosur mernbers have only recently negotiated a CET (the first  decision was
reached in December  1994 in Ouro Preto)  and therefore the structure of their CEFr has
limited external influence (e.g., no WTO offers). Moreover, if Latin American cou itries
tariff  structure  may  had  been  determined  by  "purely"  political  factors,  such  a.3 the
"import-substitution"  of the  1970s and early  1980s, recent  studies  showed that  iin  the
In the  absence  of  free-riding  effects  in group  formation,  some  studies  have  found,  within  a political-
economy  setting,  that protection  may actually  increase  beyond  the pre-regional  integration  level after
the  formation  of a CU  or Common  Market  due  to non-linearities  in  the detennination  of  the CEI (see
Cadot,  de Melo and Olarreaga,  1999,  for an example,  or Winters,  1996  for a comprehensive  survey  of
the literature).
41990s tariffs have been primarily influenced by private interests (see Faina,  1995 and
Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998).
Second, the larger  members of Mercosur (Argentina and Brazil)  are sufficiently large
trading countries to influence world prices, at least in some markets; 3 there is also recent
evidence by  Chang  and  Winters  (1999)  of the  existence of  terms-of-trade  effects in
Mercosur countries.
Third,  and  more  practically,  industrial  data  are  available for  the  larger  members  of
Mercosur at a relatively high level of disaggregation, which would be necessary when
trying to identify terms-of-trade effects.
Our results  suggest  that  in the  case of Mercosur,  both  forces  were  important  in the
determination of the common external tariff. Terms-of-trade effects account for between
6  and 28  percent  of  the  explained variance  in the  structure of  protection.  This  is  a
surprising  result  given  that  the  bloc  is  small  in  terms  of  world  GDP.  This  result
challenges researchers to reconsider how small a "small open economy" is. There is also
evidence  that  Mercosur  members  have  internalized in  their  CET  the  terms-of-trade
externality that arises when members import the same products. Thus, although political-
economy forces seem to explain a larger proportion of the common external tariffs, the
terms-of-trade rationale for tariffs cannot be neglected.
2.  Determining Mercosur's Common External Tariff
Mercosur's  CET varies between 0 and 20 percent. In  1996, the average CET over the
whole universe was 11 percent, though in the sample analyzed it is 13 percent. 4 Figure 1
3 Jointly Brazil and Argentina represent a little bit more than 1 percent of world imports. At the 4-digit
level of the ISIC Rev. 2, the shares range from 0.024 percent (logging) to 5.8 percent (grain mill
products). At the 6-digit level of the Harmonised system, the shares range from 0 percent (goat meat
and insulin, for example) to more than 30 percent (ethyl alcohol, propylene dichloride, for example).
4 The average CET over the whole tariff universe is close to 11 percent. Due to mapping of the data from
trade to industrial classification some of the agricultural products had to be dropped.
5illustrates the deviaitions from the average tariff for each of the 80 industries of the ISIC
4-digit classification. It suggests a significant variation that calls for an explanation
Industries with large deviations above the mean, i.e., more than 6 percentage points, are
concentrated in Distilled Spirits (ISIC 3131), Soft Drinks (3134), Textiles (3220. 3223
and 3240), and Transport Equipment (3849). Industries with large deviations belo  w the
mean, i.e., more than 6 percentage points, include Drugs and Medicine (3522), Petroleum
Refineries (3530), and  Cement (3692).
The remainder of the paper attempts to measure the relative importance of the terms-of-
trade and political-economy effects in the determination of the structure of the CET.
2.1  Predictions of the endogenous tariff formation literature
In the absence of lolbbies,  the presence of market power in international markets has been
identified early as a. rationale for tariffs by a benevolent government. In the presence of
terms-of-trade  effects,  a  welfare  maximizing government  sets tariffs  so that  they are
negatively correlated with the elasticity of export supply faced by the country. It is only
in the extreme case of a "small" country facing an infinitely elastic supply of e'cports
(which implies no terms-of-trade effects) that the optimal tariff would be zero.
The  political-economy  literature  has  followed  different  approaches  in  pr  vi ding
explanations for the structure of protection. This has led to many predictions that relate
industry characteristics  and economy-wide fundamentals to tariff levels. 5 As sugg,ested
by  Helpman  (1995),  different  approaches tend to  generate  similar predictions.  These
predictions are discussed in appendix 3. As an example, the most common predicicn  in
the literature is that highly concentrated sectors tend to have higher levels of proteclion as
they can more easily overcome the free-riding problem in organising an interest gro lp.
5For a discussion  of  the literature  see Rodrik  (1995)  and  for  a survey  of empirical  studies  Magee  (1997).
6Grossman and Helpman (1995b) introduced the terms-of-trade motive for protection in a
political-economy  framework,  where the  government is  subject to  industry  lobbying.
Using the influence-driven approach, developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994), they
show that in such a context the tariff structure can be disentangled into two components:
a lobbying and a terms-of trade  component. The sectoral pattern  of protection is then
determined by  both  the  political-economy variables  discussed  in  appendix 3  and  the
elasticity of export supply faced by the country:
T= f(PE;6)  (1)
where T is the vector of tariffs across industries; PE is the matrix of political-economy
variables across industries and E is the vector of export supply elasticities faced by the
country in each industry.
In a CU, such as Mercosur, the same forces are at work. However, the structure of the
optimal CET will depend on the institutional set up. Several cases can be envisaged. The
relevant case for Mercosur is one where the CET is the outcome of bargaining between
member-country governments. Indeed, the Mercosur experience in the determination of
the CET is one of bargaining between governments that were subject to national lobbying
pressures. Thus, the CET reflects cooperation between member  countries, but  not the
integration of their economies. In such a setup and using the influence-driven approach,
Cadot et al. (1999) have shown that the CET is determined by the production-weighted
sum of the different  political-economy variables in member countries. This implies that
the CET in sector i mainly reflects the preferences of the member country that has the
largest level of production in sector i. Thus:
CET=  f LyWPEi  ; J,yc)  (2)
where  superscript  c  refers  to  member  countries  of the  CU  and  subscript  i  refer to
industries; CET,  is the CET in industry i; y'  is the share of country c in the whole CU
7production of industry i. Equation (2) is at the heart of the empirical analysis belowiv  that
attempts to explain the structure of Mercosur's CET.
3.  Empirical Model
As suggested above, the optimal tariff for a large country is negatively correlated wi  th the
elasticity of supply of foreign exporters to Mercosur's markets. The empirical estimation
of these elasticities is beyond the purpose of this paper. It requires detailed information
on bilateral trade flows at the tariff line level and the characteristics of producers based in
countries exporting to the Mercosur's  market. To our knowledge there are no estimates
reported in the literature of the elasticity of export supply faced by  any country in the
world.
The  alternative path,  and the  one  we  followed,  is to  identify  the  forces  behind  the
elasticity of export supply faced by  a country. As shown below, this  elasticity can.  be
written as a function of three elements. First, the market share of the importing counitry  in
world markets.  Second, the total  world export supply elasticity.  And third, the i inport
demand elasticities of other importing countries in the world (as well as their shares in
world markets).
The empirical analysis mainly uses the import share of the importing country as a piroxy,
for reasons we make clear below. For now, note that this proxy has a  straightforvard
intuitive  rationale.  At  the  limit,  if  a  country has  an  infinitely  small  share  of  wvorld
markets, it will face an (almost) infinitely elastic supply function from foreign exp(irters.
Its ability to influence world prices is going to be very small (price-taker). On the ol1her
hand,  if a  country has a  share  of  1 in world  markets, then the supply function  fiom
foreign exporters will be more inelastic. Its ability to influence world prices is going to be
relatively high (price-maker).
3.1  Import shares as a proxy for elasticities of foreign export supply
8Are import shares a good proxy for elasticities of foreign export supply? 6 To answer this
question, we first need to define what we mean by export supply faced by one country. A
natural way  of  identifying the foreign  export supply curve  faced by  country i  is the
following:  whenever  country  i  increases  its  import  demand, this  results  in  a  price
increase. This price increase will lead to an increase in quantities exported to  country i,
which  country i perceives  as a  move along the export  supply function  it faces.  This
quantity  increase  is  a  combination  of  the  increase  in  world  export  supply  and  the
reduction of import demand in other markets due to the increase in prices. By observing
the price and quantity increase, country i determines the export supply it faces. Formally,
let us define world export supply as:
XT =  X  (3)
i=l
where  xT is  world  export  supply  and  x,  are  quantities  exported  to  country  i.  The
(perceived) export supply function faced by country i is given by:
n  n
Xi =XT  -Xi  =X-M  (4)
j#i  j#i
where m, (i Xi) are imports of country  j  (which by definition  are equal to quantities
exported to countryj by the rest-of-the-world). The idea is that the price increase in world
markets is due to a shift in demand in country i, and, therefore,  all other countries will
move along their import demand curve. This will be perceived by country i as a change in
quantities exported to its market following the change in prices.7 Differentiate both sides
of (4) byp,  multiply by P/XT  and rearrange, yielding:
6An  alternative  proof  of the  positive  relationship  between  market  share  and  optimal  tariffs  in a
monopolistic  competitive  setting  can  be found  in section  3 of  Bond  and Syropoulos  (1996).
7 TThis  is not crucial  to our  proof.  Note  that  had  we  assume  that  all imnport  demands  were  perfectly  inelastic,
we  would  have  obtained  the  same  qualitative  results.
9-g_  -eX  (5) -£i  C T  -IS  Xf
XT  jji  XT
where  s, is the elasticity of export supply faced by country i; 
6 T  is the elasticity of world
supply; and  q7,  is the elasticity  of import demand in country j.  Define  Ak =-  as the
XT
share of country k in world markets and solve for e£:
I  ~  n  ]
£i  CT  £r  EJ,  j j  (6)
Ri~~￿  jw
Ideally,  one  can calculate the  elasticities  of  export  supply faced  by  a  country using
equation (6). Import shares can be  easily calculated and there  exist some  estimates of
export supply elasticities and import demand elasticities in the literature. 8
Thus, to capture the elasticity of export supply we are left with two options. Firs-, our
preferred  option is to  use the market  share of the importing  country (Mercosur',) as a
proxy and thus avoid having to use trade elasticities, which are necessarily estimate(d  with
error.  Second,  we  could use  the  estimates  of  import  demand  elasticities  of  the  US
estimated in Shiells et al. (1986). Then assuming that all countries in the world hai,  e the
same import demand elasticities at the industry  level, and given the lack of estirnated
export supply elasticities, that the latter are uniform across industries and equal to  0.5,
equation (6) becomes:9
1[°  S  - )7us  (I - ii  (7)
sFor a review  of trade  elasticities,  see  the classic  work  by Stern  et al.(1976).  There  are  some  export  s ipply
elasticities  estimates  but they  are  mainly  done  for  agriculture  commodities,  and  not  for industria:
products.  For  estimates  of U.S.  import  demand  elasticities  at  the  industry  level,  see Shiells,  Ster:L  and
Deardoff  (1986).
9The assumed  export  supply  elasticity  is consistent  with  the  rare  estimates  reported  in Stern  et al.  (1976).
10To use equation (7) one needs to correct for the fact that it is a generated regressor that
has been estimated with error (see Gawande, 1997). Results reported in appendix 4 use
equation (7) and Gawande's correction method as a proxy for  s6.10  However, due to the
fact that our estimates are sensitive to the choice of 
6 ,  T  we decided to use Ai as a proxy
for  s,  in the paper and leave the discussion of estimates using equation (7) for appendix
4. Note that the term in square brackets in equation (7) is always positive and therefore
A,  can be used as a proxy for  £  11
3.2  Determining the CET: at the tariff line or at the industry level?
To  understand how  tariffs are  set,  one first  needs  to  know at which  level these  are
decided. Mercosur's tariff schedule has as many as 6000 tariff lines (at the 8 digit level of
the harmonised system). This tends to suggest that the appropriate level of analysis for
tariff formation is the tariff line. On the other hand, it could be argued that lobbying is
done at the industry level, as for example the textile lobby represents textile producers
and not producer's  of certain type of textiles. However, the textile lobby will rationally
lobby for protection only in certain tariff lines where there is local production.
A quick look at Mercosur's  tariff  schedule confirms this.  In  1996, the tariff level for
"High tenacity nylon for retail market" (HS 54021010; a textile product) was 16 percent.
At  the  same time,  the  tariff  level  for  "High  tenacity  amid  for  retail  market"  (HS
54021020; another textile) was 2 percent. All other "High tenacity yarn" (HS 54021090)
had a 16 percent tariff also. If lobbying was done at the industry level, all these tariffs
should be the same (if only determined by lobbying activities). However, we observed a
IO  For  the  exact  formula,  see  equation  (5)  in Gawande  (1997).
A recent  study  sutding  the  relevance  of terms-of  trade  effects  in a cross-section  of countries  and  using
relative  sizxe  as a proxy  is Djankov  and  Freund  (1999).
11700  percent  difference between  them. From  here we conclude  that  the right  level  of
analysis for tariff formation is the tariff line and not the industry.  12
Tariff data is avail-able at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized  System (HS,  more than
6000 lines). Trade data is available at the 6-digit level of the HS  (4261 lines), w-hereas
industrial data is available only at the 4-digit level of the ISIC (80 sectors). Thus, anlalysis
at the 8-digit level is not possible. We are left with two options: analysis at the 4-digit
ISIC level or analysis at the 6-digit HS level. Running the regression at the 4-digit ISIC
level implies an  important loss of trade  and tariff information available  at the 6-digit
level. To illustrate this,  the horizontal axis of Figure 2 reports  the CET coefficient of
variation within each ISIC 4-digit industry. The average is around 0.5, but it reaches up to
3 in some industries. Moreover, as suggested in Figure 2, the coefficient of variation of
Mercosur import shares seems to be positively correlated with the coefficient of variation
of the CET at the 4-digit industry level. This variation within the ISIC 4-digit category
calls for an explanation, which suggest running the regressions at the 6-digit level of the
HS.
However, given the constraint on industrial data, which is available  only at the  4-digit
industry level, analysis at the 6-digit level may give too much importance to the terns-of-
trade effects in explaining the structure of the CET. To check the robustness of our results
we report regressions both at the 4-digit and 6-digit level.
3.3  Empirical C'ET  determination
The Common External tariff in Mercosur is double-censored between 0 and 20 p -rcent
and ignoring this  censoring  could bias  our results.'3 In other words, if  only incustry-
12 One  could  argue  that the  difference  can  be explained  by terms-of-trade  effects,  but  Mercosur's
(Argentina  and  Brazil)  imports  of HS 54021010  are  equal  to US$  167000  dollars  and  imports  c:_  IS
54021020  are equal  to US$  281000  dollars  (according  to WTO  notifications).  World  trade  at th:  s level
of disaggregation  is not available,  but such small  absolute  amounts  and differences  cannot  expl.hir.
such  an important  tariff  differential.
13 Some  of the coefficienits  in the empirical  section  are quite  sensitive  to this tobit  bias, signalling  that some
of these variables  vvere  constrained  by the censoring,
12specific political-economy  and terms-of-trade  factors determined  tariffs, some tariffs
could have been negative or larger than 20. To allow for censoring  we estimate a tobit
CET model:
[CETk  ,if  0 <  CETk  <  20
CETk  0  , if  CETk*  <0
120  ,if  CETk*  >20
and  CEk*= ao  +a  £  k+a Ok+aw  aWk  +a  tk  +Ik  ak  +CC  (8)
+a TTk  +  aM  AM±aL"AMk  + a  Nk  + Ak
where ek  is the elasticity of export supply  faced by Mercosur members  in sector k (we
use import shares  (Zk)  as a proxy in the text and equation  (7) in appendix  4); Okis  the
labour share  of sector k in total Mercosur  employment;  Wk  is the wage level in sector k;
kis the labour-capital  ratio in sector k; I'kare purchases of sector k products by other
sectors; Ck  is the industry concentration  in sector k; Tk is a trade-creation  proxy; Mk  is
the net import-penetration  ratio in sector k, AMk is the change in the import-penetration
ratio for the period 1993-1996,  and Nk  is intra-industry  trade in sector k. All the aS are
parameters and  Ak  is the error term. All the explanatory  variables are taken in logs
(except for Mk and AMk  which can take negative values).  Expected signs are included
below each variable. For a description  of variable construction  see the Data Appendix
and for the economics (or political-economy)  behind each of these variables see the
Appendix  on Endogenous  Tariffs.
All the variables  are constructed  as described  in section 2, i.e., each of them is given by
the production-weighted  average of the  respective variable in  each of  the  member
countries. 14 As argued above, we believe that the tariff setting is done at the tariff line
14 Due  to the  lack  of  industrial  data  at  the  4-digit  ISIC  level  for  Uruguay  and  Paraguay,  we  only  considered
the  weighted  average  of  Argentina  and  Brazil's  variables.  In  any  case,  the  share  in  production  of
uruguay  and  Paraguay  in  Mercosur  at  the  4  digit  level  should  be  sufficiently  small  for  this  not  to  be  a
13level.  As  industrial  data  is  not  available  at  such  a  high  level  of  disaggregation  we
assumed  that  industrial  data  was uniformly  distributed  across  tariff  lines  in  a  given
industry. Thus, we divided all the industrial data by the number of lines existing at the 6-
digit level of the HS within each 4-digit ISIC category.
We are conscious that some of the explanatory variables could be jointly determined with
the dependent variable and therefore subject to endogeneity bias. For example, this is the
case when using trade shares (Ak),  defined as Mercosur's  imports of good k over world
trade of good  k. To try to  avoid this  type of bias,  we work  with  lagged explanatory
variables.'5 Our endogenous tariff is then the CET of Mercosur in  1996, whereas trade
data is the average for 1993-1996. Industrial data is based on 1985 censuses in Argentina
and Brazil that we updated to  1993-1996 values to make them comparable to trade data
(see  Data  Appendix).'6 Moreover,  the  endogeneity problem  should tend  to  bias  our
estimated  coefficienvt on  trade  shares  (a')  towards  zero.  An  alternative  is  then  to
consider our trade share estimates as lower bounds.
4.  Results
The second column of Table 1 report the results of the estimation of equation (8) at rlhe  4-
digit ISIC level (80 observations). We report results using import shares  (A) as a proxy
for the elasticity of export supply. We obtained similar results using equation  (7)  and
these are reported in appendix 4.
problem.  At the 3-digit  level (27 sectors),  the share  of Uruguay  and  Paraguay  is always  below 11l
percent,  except  in the case of textiles,  where  it reaches  13 percent (see Olarreaga  and Soloaga, 1998).
'5  Obviously,  serial  correlation  in some  variables  may have  watered  down  this correction.
6 Onecould argue  thatt4e 1996  CET  is highly  correlated  with Argentina  andBrazil's 1992  external arff
and therefore  the bias correction,  by using  lagged  variables  is not without  drawbacks.  However,
simple  partial  correlations  between  Argentina  and Brazil's 1992  external  tariff and the 1996  CE'
yield values of .64 and .74 respectively.  We acknowledge  that these  are high,  but at least not
perfectly  correlated.
14As  argued before, tariffs are determined at the tariff line level  and therefore  our data
should be interpreted as group data. Traditional estimation with group data requires that
each  observation  be  weighted  by  the  number  of  observations  in  each  group  (i.e.,
multiplied by the square root of the number of observations in each group). The rationale
is  that  if the  error  term  is  independently distributed  at the tariff  line  level, then the
variance of the error termn  at the group level will be negatively correlated with the number
of lines in each group (i.e., groups with large numbers of observations will have small
variance). Given that the number of observations in each group varies from 1 (ISIC 3131
Distilling,  rectifying  and  blending  spirits)  to  501  (ISIC  3511  Manufacture  of  basic
industrial products), this could lead to serious heteroscedasticity problems.
A problem with the above correction is that it assumes that the errors at the tariff line are
independently distributed. If one believes that  observations in the same industry  share
common unobserved  determinants, then  the  above correction may  re-introduce  some
heteroscedasticity. 7 We  tested  for  this  after  weighting  our  observations  following
Dickens'  (1990) test  and we  could not  reject the presence  of  a  common unobserved
determinant at the industry level. 18 Thus, we corrected for the presence of a common
error  component using  a two-stage  approach suggested  by Dickens  (1990).  First,  we
consistently estimate the variance of the common and individual component of the error
term by running the squared error of the weighted regression on a constant and  1/n1;
where  n1 is the number of observations in group j.  The coefficient of the constant is a
consistent estimate of the common error component variance, and the coefficient  1/n 3 is
17 The presence  of common  unobserved  characteristics  will lead  to an error term at the tariff line level of
the following  form:  Aj  = vi + v,,j where vY is the shared  groupj error component If both
components  of the errors  are independently  distributed,  then the variance  of the error term  at the
group  level is then given by: var(jiJ) = cr,2  +  a2I/nj  where nj is the number  of observations  in each
group  and c'  is the variance  of the z component  of the error term.
18  Dickens  (1990)  suggests  running  the squared  error term of the weighted  regression  on a constant  and  the
number  of observations.  If the coefficient  is significant  (at the 99 percent  level in our case),  then one
should  try an alternative  weighting  method.  Using Kennedy's  (1985)  rule of thumb,  that the estimated
variance of the common  element  over  the variance  of the number  of observation  should  be smaller
than 15  percent  for the traditional  weighting  method  to work, we also  concluded  against  the
traditional  method.
15a consistent estimate of the individual error component. Then we divide each observation
by  Fu2  + 6,2/1n  which yields asymptotically efficient estimates for our regression. The
results are presented in column 1 of table 1.
All the variables have the expected sign, with the exception of the labour share (9).  the
net-import penetration ratio  ( M  )  and its  change (AAM),  all  of which  are  statistically
insignificant.'9 The significant variables  are: the terms-of-trade proxy (A),  suggesting
that in the case of Mercosur, the market share of member countries in world trade had a
significant effect  on  the  CET  structure;  the  labour-capital ratio  (f),  suggesting that
industry  lobbying by  capital  owners was  important;  input sales to  other  sectors  ( I)
suggesting  that  counter-lobbying  at  the  industry  lobby  was  important.  These  three
variables are also robust to both, exclusion of other variables and observations.
These  results  seem  to  show  the  significance  of  the  terms-of-trade  effect  on  t;i  riff
determination. However,  by grouping data  at the industry level (4-digit ISIC),  we  are
losing an  important amount of information of within industry tariff and  import shares
variation. Also, as argued before, there is strong evidence that tariffs are not determi led
at the industry level but at the tariff line level. To include this information, we thereiol e
run the regression at the 6-digit HS level.
At the 6-digit level data there are only 126 different tariff levels over the 4200 tariff lir.es,
indicating that clustering of data could present a problem for our estimations. We add e~.s
this issue by applying the Generalised Huber correction procedure.  Standard errors are
corrected for within  CET correlation  and  heteroscedasticity. As  expected  the  ove -all
significance of  the  regression  after  the  correction falls.  Again  we  comment  only  on
results reported in column 3 using  2 as a proxy for the elasticity of export supply, gi i"en
the non-robustness of results using equation (7).
19 This  is consistent  with Olarreaga  and  Soloaga  (1998),  which  suggested  that  the  explanation  for  this
insignificant  result  is that  labour-unions  were  excluded  from  the  CET  negotiations  in Mercosur  an(I
that,  as well  as being  potentially  endogenous  (Trefler,  1993),  import-penetration-ratio  effects  are  ritt
uniiquely  signed  even  in theory.
16All variables have the expected signs except for the labour-share (9 ), the wage ( W) and
the change  in  import  penetration  (AM).  The statistically significant variables  are: i)
import-shares  (A),  suggesting that the terms-of-trade effect may partially  explain the
structure of the CET. The positive sign implies that sectors with larger import shares in
world trade,  and therefore  smaller perceived elasticities of world export  supply, have
higher tariffs; ii) the labour-capital ratio (I?). The positive coefficient implies that labour-
intensive sectors tend to be more protected; iii) the share of output purchased by other
sectors as inputs (I).  The negative coefficient suggests that sectors that sell large shares
of their output as intermediate inputs to other sectors will tend to have lower tariffs. This
reflects counter-lobbying by purchasing sectors.; iv) the industry concentration (C).  The
positive sign suggests that more concentrated industries will have higher tariffs, reflecting
free-riding effects in  larger groups, a  la Olson; and  v)  intra-industry trade  (N).  The
negative coefficient implies that sectors in which there are large amounts of intra-industry
trade tend to have lower tariffs, also reflecting counter-lobbying by input purchasers.
The above analysis that both lobbying by industries (pro-lobbying and counter-lobbying)
and terms-of-trade effects can contribute to the explanation of the structure of the CET in
Mercosur. Our results suggest that labour-unions do not contribute to the explanation of
the  structure of the CET. The relative contribution of the terms-of-trade  effect to the
overall explanation of the tariff structure is studied in section 5.
4.1  Internalization: did it occur?
Terms-of-trade  effects  lead  to  price  externalities  among  countries  that  trade  similar
goods. When Brazil raises its tariffs on imported goods, this leads to a fall in international
prices.  If  Argentina  imports  similar  goods,  this  causes  a  positive  externality  for
Argentina, as imports are now cheaper. In other words, had Brazil considered the effects
of its tariffs not  only  on its terms-of-trade,  but  also on Argentina's  terms-of-trade,  it
would have set a higher tariff. Obviously, the externality would have been negative had
Argentina's exports to the world been of mainly the same products as Brazil imported.
17The creation of a CU raises the opportunity for the internalization of the terms-of-trade
externality, as suggested by Riezman (1985). Members of a CU should not be focusing
any longer on the individual countries'  market power when trying to set their tariffs, but
on the  market  power  of the  whole  CU.  This  section explores whether  the Mercosur
bargaining process over the CET has led to the internalization of this externality.
In terms of our empirical model, this implies that the terms-of-trade variable should not
be constructed  as the production weighted  average of members'  market share in world
markets, but as the siraple sum of members'  market share in world markets. That sum is
the share of the whole union in world markets.
In the case of Mercosur, the internalization of the terms-of-trade externality should lead
to  a larger effect of the terms-of-trade variable in the  CET. The reason for this  is that
Argentina and Brazil tend to import similar products, as shown in figure 3. Indeed figure
3 shows that there is a positive relationship between the import shares of Argentina arid
Brazil in the world market at the 4-digit level of the ISIC classification. 20 This suggests a
positive terms-of-trade externality between the two members of Mercosur.
Table  2 reports  the  results  of the estimation  of equation (8)  when the terms-of-tiracle
variable is constructed as the sum of Mercosur members' import shares. As expected, the
coefficient on the terms-of-trade variable increases not only in terms of levels, but alsi)  n
significance. All the other variables keep the same sign and same level of significantce.
The general fit of the regression also increases, both at the 4-digit ISIC and the 6-digit HS
level.
To determine the correct  empirical  specification,  i.e., whether one  should specify the
terms-of-trade variable as including internalization or not, we performed two  diffe]ent
types  of non-nested tests.  The first, a "super moder'  test, includes all the variables  lthat
the two models have in common and also the variables that are different in one equation.
18The test consists of verifying which of the non-common variables are significant and
which are not.  The largest drawback of this  test is that  it does  not really  distinguish
between the two models, but rather between one of the models and a hybrid one. In our
case, there may also be some collinearity between the two terms-of-trade variables, i.e.,
the internalized terms-of-trade variable and the non-internalized terms-of-trade variable.
The J test proposed by Davidson and McKinnon (1981) overcomes these problems. To
test which is the appropriate model, one estimates a regression with all the variables of
the first model and the fitted value of the alternative. If the coefficient  in front  of the
fitted value is insignificant, then one cannot reject the first model.
Using both types of tests for both levels of disaggregation (4-digit ISIC and 6-digit HS),
we could never reject the hypothesis that the model capturing the internalization of the
terms-of-trade was the true model, as shown in table 3. On the other hand,  we could
always reject the hypothesis that the model including the non-internalization of terms-of-
trade variable was the true model.
This led us to conclude that in the case of Mercosur, the governments were aware of the
terms-of-trade externalities and that these were internalized within the CET. This result
supports the hypothesis that terms-of-trade effects were non-negligible determinants of
Mercosur's CET. But how important were these effects in explaining the structure of the
CET? This is the question addressed in the next section.
5.  How important is the terms-of-trade effect?
The  previous  section  has  identified  terms-of-trade  effects  behind  the  structure  of
Mercosur's  CET. Moreover, there is evidence that the terms-of-trade externality among
Mercosur members has been internalized within the CET. This would suggest that even
for "small" countries (around 1 percent of world markets), the terms-of-trade rationale for
20 A similar  positive  correlation  is found  at the 6-digit  of the HS classification.
19tariffs may be valid.  However, before concluding on the importance of this effect on the
tariff structure, we need to measure the share of the CET variation that can be attributed
to the terms-of-trade effect.
One way of answering this  question is to run equation (8) with and without the import
shares variable. We ithen  calculate the different  R2 s and respectively denote them FR2,
WR 2 The  share  of the  explained variation  in the  full-model that  represents  a  clear
association with the terms-of trade effect is then given by  v  = (FR 2 - WR
2 )/FR 2 21
The problem with  censored  regressions  is  that  there  exist  many alternative R2s.  We
calculate T using three  different  pseudo- R2 S:  the  McFadden  (1973), the Aldrich and
Nelson (1984), and the Veall and Zimmermann  (1994) (MF, AN,  and VZ respectively
hereafter). The one reported  in table  1 is the  VZ. The most  commonly used is the Mc
Fadden. However, according to Veall and Zimmermann (1994) Monte-Carlo simulations,
the  McFadden  pseudo-R 2 is  severely  downward  biased.  They  tested  10  different
possibilities and argued that  VZ is the single best choice, whereas the one proposed in
Aldrich and Nelson (:1984)  is a second-best.
The share of the explained variation that can be attributed to  A, according to these three
pseudo- R2 s is given in table 4. Our results suggest that in the case of Mercosur, terms-
of-trade motivations  explain between 6 and  18 percent of the total variation.  At the 6-
digit HS  level,  the siimple average  of the three alternative indicators  suggests that  13
percent of the explanation can be attributed to terms-of-trade effects. Similarly, at tile 4-
digit ISIC level, the average is 8 percent.  This suggests that an important share o:t the
terms-of-trade action occurs within industries.
21 The indicator  T' may be seen  as a maximum  or minimum  bound  for the explained  share  depending  oil
whether  there is positive  or negative  correlation  between  the A  and the political-economy  variablk  s,
respectively.  Values  in table 4 should  be seen  as minimum  bounds  at the 6-digit level  of the HS ariLd
maxdmum  bounds  at dthe  4-digit level  of ISIC,  due to positive  correlation  at the 6-digit  and negativ at
the 4-digit  level.
20Taking  the total  average  over the  6  possible  shares indicates that  13 percent  of the
explained CET variation can be clearly attributed to  terms-of-trade effects. This is an
extremely large value, especially in the case of Mercosur, whose member countries are
not the first candidates when one thinks of price-makers in world markets. 22
6.  Conclusions
The trade literature  has followed two different  approaches to  explain the existence of
tariffs:  the terms-of-trade  approach and the  interest  group  pressures approach.  When
analyzing the effects of regionalism on the multilateral system, the two approaches lead
to different conclusions. For example, using the terms-of-trade approach, one concludes
that tariffs on rest-of-the-world imports should increase after the formation of a regional
block, because the market power of the region increases and terms-of trade externalities
can be internalized in the CET of a CU. On the other hand, using a political-economy
approach, one would usually conclude that tariffs with respect to the rest-of-the world
decline after the formation of a CU. The rationale is related to free-riding effects in larger
lobbying groups. Thus, it seems important to know what the forces are behind tariffs.
Surprisingly,  when  empirically  studying  tariff  structures, researchers  have  essentially
focused  on  the  second  approach  and  neglected  the  terms-of-trade  as  a  possible
explanatory variable. This study shows that in the case of Mercosur, between 6 and 27
percent of the explained variation of the CET can be attributed to terms-of-trade effects.
We  also  explore  the  possibilities  of  internalization  of  terms-of-trade  effects  when
member countries import the same goods. There is evidence that Mercosur's bargaining
process among members in the determination of the CET has led to the internalization of
22 Using the VZ  pseudo-R 2 we found  that 17  to 48 percent  of the variation  in the CET can be attributed  to
counter-lobbying  variables,  and 10 to 41 percent  to capital  owners'  pro-lobbying  (depending  on
whether  the regression  is done at the tariff line  or industry  level. The contribution  of the labour-union
proxy  is negligible.  Note that  the large share  of counter-lobbying  variables  in the explanation  of the
structure  may  partially  explain  the significant  unilateral  tariff reduction  in  Mercosur's countries
during  the 1990s.
21these  effects.  As  l!ercosur's  members tended  to  import  similar  products, the
internalization  of the positive  externality  represented  an upwards  force in the CET.
More generally,  these results tend to suggest that the relevance of the "small" country
assumption  may be limited to a small number of cases, as Mercosur represents only 1
percent  of world markets,  but terms-of-trade  effects  seem  to be relatively  important.
Finally, when studying  the implications  of regionalism  on external tariffs towards nIon-
members, one should try to  simultaneously model the  two  rationales behind CU
formation,  as they both explain  a significant  share  of tariff formation.
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27Table 1: Determining the CET
4-digit  ISIC  6-digit  HS
Terms-of-trade  effects
1/ &  (using  import shares  (A)  0.72#  1.49*
asaproxy)  (0.39)  (0.61)
Labour union proxy
0 (labour-shares)  -0.051  -0.641
(0.50)  (0.77)
Counter-lobbying in factor or
input markets
W(wage)  -.601  0.891
(1.64)  (1.98)
I  (share sold as input)  -1.84**  -4.99**
(0.61)  (1.48)
N  (intra-industry trade)  -.331  -8.74**
(1.51)  (3.29)
Capital  Owners  Lobbying
£  (labour-capital ratio)  3.30**  8.13**
(1.11)  (1.91)
C  (Industry concentration)  0.58  1.45#
(0.49)  (0.79)
T  (Trade creation)  -0.061  -0.08
(0.44)  (0.63)
M  (net-import penetration)  0.001  -0.001
(0.00)  (0.00)
AM (changes in M)  -0.001  -0.001
(0.01)  (0.00)
Constant  -1.73  -20.08
(7.52)  (14.62)
pseudob-  R 2 0.28  0.50
Sigma  3.65**  7.68**
%of  censored obs.  5  20
number of obs.  80  4261
aEstimation  is done using a Tobit double  censored  regression.  Figures  in parenthesis  are standani
errors.  **  denotes  significance  at the 1 percent  level; * at the 5 percent  level  and # at the 10
percent level; I indicates  that  the sign of the estimated  coefficient  is not robust  to either  varial&
or 4-digit industrv  exclusion  from the regression.
bThe  pseudo-R 2 we used is the single  best choice  according  to Mc Veall  and Zinunernnann  (1  .94),
i.e., R 2 = Y((CE  -CT  *)2 /[(CET -CET  ) +ncr
2 where  CET  *isthemeanofthe
predicted  value.
28Table 2: CET and internalization of terms-of-trade effectsa
4-digit ISIC  6-digit HS
Terms-of-trade effects
A (import shares)  0.87*  3.04**
(0.39)  (0.91)
Labour union proxy




W(wage)  -.62  0.09
(1.62)  (2.51)
I  (share sold as input)  -1.88**  -5.90**
(0.59)  (1.62)
N  (intra-industry trade)  -.32  -15.60**
(1.51)  (4.62)
Capital Owners Lobbying
e  (labour-capital ratio)  3.36**  9.95**
(1.09)  (2.09)
C  (Industry concentration)  0.60  1.7 1*
(0.49)  (0.81)
T  (Trade creation)  -0.06  -0.16
(0.44)  (0.69)
M (net-import penetration)  0.00  -0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)
AM (changes in M)  -0.00  -0.00
(0.01)  (0.00)
Constant  -2.16  -33.76*
(7.40)  (13.82)
pseudo-R2 0.30  0.70
Sigma  3.62**  7.60**
% of  censored obs.  5  20
number of obs.  80  4261
aEstimation  is done using  a Tobit  double  censored  regression.  Figures  in parenthesis  are standard
errors. ** denotes  significance  at the 1  percent  level; * at the 5 percent  level  and # at the 10
percent level.
29Table 3: Testing terms-of-trade internalizationa
H10  Hypothesis  HS 6-digit  ISIC 4-digit_
Davidson-  HO:  Internalization  No rejection  No rejection
McKinnon J-  HO:  No-internalization  Reject  Reject
test
Non-nested  HO:  Internalization  No rejection  No rejection
"super model"  HO:  No-internalization  Reject  Reject
aT'e degree of oonfidence  for all test is 5 percent.
Table 4: Share  of the explanation attributed to the terms-of-trade proi:y
(in percentages)
MF 6-digit  AN 6-digit  VZ 6-digit  MF 4-digit  AN 4-digit  VZ 4--digit
T  18  11  12  8  6  1.0
T  *R 2 4.4  4.8  5.8  0.5  1.5  2.9
Tint  28  27  6.0  12  9.1  14
Tynt*R 2 14  15  3.6  0.7  2.3  4.1
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Tariffs. Common external tariff data were provided by the M:ERCO  SUR secretariat
(official tariffs for 1996, announced in December 1995). External and Internal tariffs of
member countries were obtained from officials journal (Argentina, decree # 998/95 Af
29/Dec/95 and resolutions # 649/96, 3  70/96, 111/96 and 735/96. Brazil, decree # 17  5  7' of
29/Dec/95. Paraguay, decree # 12056 of 29/Dec/95. Uruguay, decree # 466/95 of
29/Dec/95 and decrees # 242/996, 282/996 and 316/996.), and from UNCTAD. Tar6iff
data are disaggregated at the 8-digit level of the harmonised system (9119 items) and11
were converted to the 6-digit level by simple averages.
Trade data. The sou:rces are national accounts (COMTRADE) in US dollars. Data weire
averaged for 1993-96 and disaggregated at the 6-digit level of the harmonised system. To
convert them to ISIC 4-digit we use a filter that has been provided by Jerzy Rozanski of
the World Bank.
Industrial  data. The sources are the industrial censuses applied by Argentina and Brazil
in 1985, and the GTAP database.
Census data consist of:  i) number of firms, ii) wages, iii) total value of
production, and iv) value of inputs. To make them comparable to trade data values, all the
industrial data denominated in domestic currency were converted to 1993-96 US dollar
values with the ratio of the average nominal GDP in Manufacture in 1993-96 (from
National Accounts) to the total value added calculated from censuses figures. The dal  a
are disaggregated into 80 sectors corresponding to the 4-digit ISIC level.
GTAP data gave the input-output matrices, one for each country. We utilized
them to calculate the share of production sold by sector i of countryj  (Sij) as intermed:Liate
good to other sectors in the same country. We then applied the Sij to the correspondirng
sectors in our data set. Some Sij were used more than once since GTAP data have fev,  er
sectors (40) than that from censuses (80).
34Appendix  2. Variable  construction  and notation
The construction of the variables used in the empirical section is discussed below. Most
of the exogenous variables may also be functions of tariffs (Trefler, 1993), but due to
data restrictions, the empirical section does not deal with endogeneity problems.
We used in the paper two levels of aggregation. One was at the 6-digit level of the HS (6-
HS for short), and the other was at the 4-digit of the ISIC (4-ISIC). Data for tarifs,
import shares, and the proxy for intra-industry trade are at 6-HS (4261 observations). All
the other variables are at 4-ISIC (80 observations). When we run the regression at 6-HS,
we repeat the corresponding 4-ISIC information for each 6-HS line, following the filter.
All of MERCOSUR's political-economy variables are constructed as the sector-
production-weighted sum of member countries' political variables, as discussed in
subsection 2.1 Alternative specifications for MERCOSUR have been tested and are
discussed in section 4.1.
*  Tariffs. We converted the HS 8-digit tariff data to 6-HS levels by taking simple
averages by 6-HS. We obtained 4-ISIC levels' tariffs by mapping 6-HS to 4-ISIC and
then  averaging the tariffs by 4-ISIC.
*  import shares. We added up Argentine and Brazil imports' (at 6-HS), netted out intra-
country trade, and divided the net sum by total world imports. For aggregation at 4-
ISIC we followed the same procedure used above for tariffs. (denoted A).  [+]
*  labor union proxy. Was calculated as: (number of employees in sector i)/(total number
of employees). (denoted 9).  [+]
*  wages. These were calculated as: (labour cost)/(number of employees). (denoted W)
[+1
labour/capital ratios. These were calculated as: (number of employees)/(value added -
labour costs). (denoted X).  [+1
35*  input sales. These were calculated  as the share  of production  sold  by sector i of
countryj (Sij) as intermediate  good to other sectors  in the same country.  (denoted )[-]
*  concentration  index.  This  was calculated  as: (number  of firms  in the whole
economy)/(number  of firms in sector i). (denoted  C) [+].
*  trade-creation  term. This was calculated  as: (intra-MERCOSUR  imports)/(total
output).  (denoted  7) [+].
*  net import  penetration  ratio. This was calculated  as: (imports  - exports)/(gross  output).
(denoted  M) [-].  We used extra-MERCOSUR  trade to calculate  this variable.  Note that
for this variable  we could not take logs.
*  Change  in the nel import  penetration  ratio. This  was calculated  as  M96-M93  .Note
that for this variable  we could not take logs.
*  intra-industry  trade. This was calculated  as: 1/[(imports-exports) 2/(imports  +
exports) 2]0 5. We used extra-MERCOSUR  data. (denoted  N) [-].
361.  ISIC 4-DIGIT  CLASSIFICATION
3111  Slaujghtei  peam  n  rsrigma  51  Tre  n  ueidsre
3112  Manufacture of dair-y  products  3559  Manufactur  of rubber products not elsewhere
3113  annndrsrigfltssdgeae  cassified___
3114  Cannisng,  preservfing  and processing of fish,  3560  Manufacture of plastic products not elsewhere
crustacea and simiilar  foods  classified  ___
315  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and  3610  Manufacture of  pottery, china and eatenware
fats  3620  Mnftueof  lass adgaspout
3116  . Clrain mill products  -3691  - Manufacture of structural clayyout
317_aufctr  of bake_r.poucTs_!  3692  Manufacture of cement,_lme and plaster
3118  Sugarfactories  and refineries  3699  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products
3119  Manfcueof  cocoa, chocolate and sugar  --  ntelsewhere  classified
1 confectionerV  ~~~~~~~3710  Iron and steel basic industries
321  Manufacture of food products not elsewhere  3720  Non-ferrous metal basic industries
classitied............  ......................  ---  3811  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general
3122  Manufacture of p~ae  nmlfeeds  hardware
3131  Distilling~ec~tf1in  an  lnigp  82  Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily
3132  Wine industries  of metal  _______
3133  Malt liquors and malt  3813 - -Manufacture  of structur-almearout
3134  Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries  3819  Manufacture of fabricated metal products except
3140  Tobacco  manufactures  ~~~~~~~machinery  and equipment not elsewhere
...  .....  -- a  -----  - ----- ------------ . .......-....  lassi-e-
...  ......  ..  3821  Manufactreofe____t_rbne 3212  Manufacture of mnade-up  textile goods except  --......... sandturine
- wearingapparel  ~~~~~3822  Manufacture of agricultural machinery and
3823  .Manufacture  of metal and wood working 3214  Manufacture of caret  andru~gs  aci
3215  .Cordage,  rope and twine industries  ................  ...  .
Manufacture  --  -.-  ~~~~~3824  Manufacture of special industrsal machinery and
-I1  notelewer-casifed-qipmenit  except metal and wood working
3220  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except  mciey____
footwear  - _._  ___-  _  ___
-~~~~~~~~~~~  ---  ..--...........  --.--  3825  Manufacture of office, computing and
3231  .Tanneries  and leather fsnishinR  - conigahns  __
- 3232  Fur drssing  nd djyin~ inustrie  -....................  3829  Machinery and equipment except electrical, not
3233 - Manufacture of products of leather, except  elsewhere classified_____
footwe... and...  . w.e-a!nn-  ......... ... ----- re---  3831  Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery
3240  Manufacture of footwear  dappartus.
3311  Sawmills,  laningand other woods  3832  Manufacture of radio, television and
3312  -ManufaLcture  of wooden and cane containers  commnunicat~ion  e  tan4pparaus
3319  Manufacture of wood and cork products not  3833  Manufacture of electrical appliances and
-elsewhere  classified  housewares  ___
3320  _  Manufacture of furniture  3839  Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies
3411  Manufactur  of p!jtp,ya~adppror  not elsewhere classified  ___
3412  Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper  3841  S-  bilin  ndrea_n
and paperboard-3842  Manufacture of railroad equipment  .
3419  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  383  Manufacture of motor vehicles
articles not elsewhere classified  3844  Manufacture of motorycles  and bicycles
3420  Printing, publishing and allied industre  3845  Manufacture of aircraft
3511  Mnfcueof  basic industrial chemicals  3849  Manufacture of trasport  equipment not
except fertilizers  elsewhere classified
3512  __  Manufacture of fertilizers andypesticides  3851  Manufacture of professional and scientific, and
3513  Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic  measuring and controlling equipment, not
materials  and man-made  fibers  eKcepgas  elsweecaifd
3521  Manufacture of paints, varnishes and lacqueFs  3852  .Manufac-ture  of phtogaphic  and  oods5~
3522  Manufacture of drugs and medicines  3853  Manufacture of watches and clocks
3523  Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations,  391  Mnfacture  ofiwiyand  related articles
perfumes, cosmetics and other toilet  3902  Manufacture of musical instruments
preparations--3903  Manufacture of sporting and athetic  goods
3529  Manufacture of chemiical  products not elsewhere  3909  Manufacturing industries not elsewhere
classified  casfe
3530  Petroleum refieneris
3540  Manufacture of mniscellaneous  products of
______petroleum  and  coal
37Appendix  3: Endogenous  Tariff  Appendix
Following  is a list of predictions  of expected  cross-sectoral  variations  in tariff protection.
Other  things equal,  the lev;el  of  protection  rleceived  by an industry is higher:  23
Terms-of-trade effects
*  the smaller the  lasicit  of export  s fpply  faced  by the country. This is the classic
rationale  for tariffs for a large counti-v  that can influence  the terms-of-trade  in its
favour by setting non-zero  tariffs.
Labour union effects
*  the larger  is the share of labour in this sector relative  to total employment  in the
economy  (see Cadot et al., 1997,  for a theoretical  justification  and de Melo and Tarr,
1994,  for an empirical  example).  The idea  behind  this result is that if labour unions  are
organised,  then the larger is the share  of employment  in this sector, the larger is thle
24 weight of this sector's  labour union  in the political  game.
Counter-lobbying  in factor or input markets
the lower  the equilibrium  wage in this sector. In a political  game where there is ri "alry
in the labour market (which  can be segmented  for different  groups  of industries),  -h-c
level of the equilibrium wage, ceteris paribus, will determine the incentives by otler
sectors  to lobby  against an increase  in tariff in one of the industries.  At the limit,  i lIhe
wage is zero, there are no incentives  to counter-lobbying.
23 For  a survey  of the  theoretical  and empirical  literatare,  see  Baldwin  (1984),  Rodrik  (1995)  or  Mage
(1997). This appendix largely draws on section 2 of Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998).
24 Alternatively,  it may also  be the case that votes may  matter and  a high  labour/capital  ratio  indicates  the
presence  of voters (see  for example  Potters, Sloof  and van Winden,  1997).*  the lower the share of sector production that is purchased by other sectors as
intermediates (see Cadot et al., 1997, for a theoretical justification and Ray, 1991, or
Marvel and Ray, 1983, for empirical examples). Here we are capturing lobbying
rivalry. If sectorj  purchases goods from sector i then sectorj  will counter-lobby any
increase in sector i's level of protection. Thus, the higher the share of sector i
production that is purchased by other sectors the smaller the endogenous tariff
Therefore, as long as consumers are not organised, consumer goods receive ceteris
paribus higher levels of protection than intermediate goods.
*  the smaller the share of intra-industry trade. Levy (1997) argues that an increase in
intra-industry trade benefits all agents whereas an increase in inter-industry trade has
the usual Stolper-Samuelson redistributive effects, and therefore is subject to more
conflict and higher lobbying pressures. Marvel and Ray (1987) suggest an explanation
based on intermediate inputs counter-lobbying. They argue that intra-industry trade
essentially arises among producers (purchase of intermediate goods), and as producers
are more concentrated than consumers, they tend to be more efficient in combating
protectionist pressures. This, however, should be captured by our previous variable.
Capital Owners Pro-protectionist Lobbying
the higher the labour/capital ratio (for empirical evidence, see e.g., Finger and
Harrison, 1994, and Rodrik, 1995). To explain this, one may need to rely on Cadot et
al. (1997) who show that tariffs are higher in sectors where the share of capital
remuneration in value added is large, after introducing lobbying rivalry on the labour
market. A higher labour/capital ratio ceterisparibus has two opposing effects on the
share of capital remuneration in value added. On one hand, the direct effect tends to
reduce it, as a higher labour/capital ratio obviously implies a smaller capital/labour
ratio. On the other hand, a higher labour/capital ratio implies a higher marginal
productivity of capital relatively to labour which in turn raises the share of capital
remuneration in value added. Under suitably general conditions, it can then be shown
that the latter effect dominates the former if the elasticity of substitution between
39labour and capital is smaller than 1 (which is a generally accepted value in the
empirical literature). 25
*  the higher the level of industry concentration (see Rodrik, 1987, for a theoretical
justification and Trefler, 1993, or Marvel and Ray, 1983, for empirical examples).
This captures free-riding incentives a la Olson.
*  the lower the level of trade-creation. The idea is simply that in sectors where there is
an important amount of trade-creation within the region, there is no longer a need to
protect domestic producers from rest-of-the world competition, as most foreign
competition now comes from within the region.
- the lower the import penetration ratio (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994, for a
theoretical justification). 26 The rationale for this is that the lower the import
penetration ratio, the lower is the relative weight of consumers compared to producers
in the government's  objective function. 27
*  the larger the increase in import penetration.  This captures the idea that decliniri  g
sectors (those where there is a large increase in import penetration) will tend to tie
more protected by the government to reduce the adjustment costs (see Brainard and
Verdier, 1994).
In a two  factor  sector,  the share  of capital  remuneration  in value  added is given  by:
j = rk/lwe + rk] = I./[w/rk + 11,  where  r is capital  wage,  k is the  amount  of capital,  w is labour vage
and X is the  amount  of labour.  Then  aP/La(e/k)  =  l4we/(rk)  + 1]J  w/r(l + a)  where  a  is  the
elasticity  of substitution  between  labour  and  capital.  And  the  right  hand  side  is larger  than  zero  il
lal  <  1. Note  that  the  empirical  estimation  of  the  elasticities  of substitution  between  labour  and  c  ipital
generally  yield  values  below one.
26 This  result  has  been  challenged  on  empirical  grounds,  as discussed  by Rodrik  (1995).  For empiricai
examples,  see Anderson  (1980) or Finger  and Harrison  (1994).
27 To see  this,  note  that ni/y = (c - y) / y  = c / y - lwhere  m are  imports  (or  net  imports),  c is consuniption
andy the level of production.
40Appendix 4: An alternative proxy for terms-of-trade effects
Table 5 report results using equation (7) as a proxy for the elasticity of export
supply  faced  by  Mercosur  countries (and  e
6'  = 0.5).  Results  are  qualitatively
robust to the alternative specification. The problem with using equation (7) is that
results are sensitive to the choice of eT, which is arbitrarily chosen as being equal
across sectors due to lack of estimates. For example, for any value of  CT  larger
than 3 the estimate in front of 1/16  is statistically insignificant.
Table 5: Determining the CET
4-digit  ISIC  6-digit  HS
Terms-of-trade  effects
1/  6  (using  eq (7) as a proxy)  0.31*  0.19#
(0. 15)  (0. I10)
Labour  union proxy
0 (labour-shares)  2.61**  1.12
(0.85)  (0.70)
Counter-lobbying  in factor  or
input markets
W (wage)  -3.88  0.01
(2.75)  (3.49)
I  (share sold as input)  -1.99**  -4.51**
(0.57)  (1.86)
N  (intra-industry  trade)  -2.99**  -0.93
(0.97)  (0.73)
Capital  Owners  Lobbying
£ (labour-capital  ratio)  0.77  6.03**
(2.01)  (2.39)
C  (Industry  concentration)  1.73*  0.86
(0.74)  (1.20)
T  (Trade  creation)  0.86  0.68
(0.64)  (0.80)
M (net-import  penetration)  0.00  -0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)
AM (changes  in M  )  -0.00  -0.00
(0.01)  (0.00)
Constant  0.65  -5.90
(11.59)  (18.27)
pseudo-  R2 0.29  0.31
Sigma  2.75**  5.11**
% of censored  obs.  5  20
number  of obs.  80  4261
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